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Ethical Method in Aristotle:
Setting Out the Phainomena

I

Recent work on Aristotle's method in ethics has enabled us more than ever
to appreciate the power and sophistication of his thinking in this area· We
now have a much firmer basis for believing that we may have important lessons
to learn from Aristotle about the nature and limits of moral theory. However,
it is not yet clear what those important lessons are for there is fundamental
disagreement about the nature of Aristotle's method· Some claim that the
moral theory of the Ethics rests on principles that are not susceptible to any
form of rational justification; others claim that, although moral first prin
ciples cannot be scientifically demonstrated, they can be justified through
dialectical arguments - arguments based on opinions that are widely shared or
held by figures who can speak with some authority about the matters in ques
tion. still another view has it that Aristotle bases his moral theory on cer
tain principles about human nature drawn from his psychology and metaphysics.

The diversity of these views reflects, I believe, the complexity of the
phenomena we have to account for in a study of Aristotle's method in ethics.
There are passages that provide some support for each of the views I have
mentioned, and it is therefore hard to see how the divergent strands of his
thought can be made coherent, whether or not we can hope for a coherent
picture in the end, the first task, as Aristotle says, is to set out the
phenomena and discuss the difficulties. The phenomena I have in mind are not
only remarks about ethical method but passages in which we can clearly see
methodological principles being applied. I hope to show that more work is
needed on this first stage of a study of Aristotle's ethical method; what we
need and do not yet have is a careful and complete setting out of the
phenomena.1

Several of the’ key passages on method in the ethical treatises are
thought to be related to Aristotle's theory of dialectic. For instance, the
well known passage that serves as a preface to the discussion of acrasia in
NE VII has been described as a convenient summary of what dialectic meant for
Aristotle. In the first part of my discussion I will give a brief account of
dialectic as it is portrayed in the Topics, and will try to show that it is
quite different from the "method of endoxa" described in NE VII. I will then
turn to the discussion of happiness in NE I, and argue that some of the proce
dures used by Aristotle fit the method of endoxa, but some do not. Finally, I
will try to determine the exact role of endoxa in the discussion of happiness
in NE I, and make a foray into the question, what sort of rational justifica
tion, if any, does Aristotle offer for his ethical first principles?

II

Dialectic, as Aristotle understands it in the Topics, is a particular
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kind of rule-governed discussion.^ The kinds of questions appropriately ad
dressed in a dialectical discussion are those over which people are divided in
their views - i.e. matters of controversy and doubt.3 such discussions
apparently take place in public and are always between two individuals, a
questioner and an answerer. The answerer either chooses or is assigned a
“thesis" to defend. The aim of the questioner is to refute the thesis by
establishing.its contradictory.4 The questioner must formulate his questions
so that they admit of a simple yes or no answer. Aristotle sets out rules and
guidelines for both questioner and answerer.® some of the rules are of the
nature of requirements that must be met if the discussion is to qualify as
dialectical; others are designed to tell one how to achieve success as a
dialectician, success is not determined by whether one succeeds, as an
answerer, in defending a thesis, or, as a questioner, in refuting the
opponent’s thesis; one might lose the debate but still perform better than
one's adversary if, for example, you had to defend a thesis that was
relatively easy to refute but you made it quite difficult for your opponent.®

The currency of dialectical discussion is opinion rather than truth.? The
premises of dialectical arguments are endoxa- “reputable opinions“, following
the felicitous translation of Jonathan Barnes.® Reputable opinions can be
ranked in terms of their degree of reputability; some endoxa are more endoxon
than others.® In formulating his arguments, the dialectician will make the
best use of the available resources; in other words, his arguments will be
based on the most reputable opinions a v a i l a b l e . ( T h e answerer must be care
ful to concede only premises that have a fairly high degree of reputability
relative to the thesis he is defending. )·*■·*· The dialectician will sometimes
need to base his argument on premises which he recognizes to be false; some
times he will argue for false conclusions.^ This is in no way incompatible
with dialectic since what is important in dialectical arguments is not whether
the premises are true but whether they are reputable opinions.
For if it depends on false but reputable
argument is dialectical (logikos); if on
reputable premises, it is a bad argument
point of view of dialectic].
(Top. VIII

premises, the
true but not
[i.e., from the
12, 162b 27-28.)

Aristotle contrasts dialectical discussions with sophistical discussions,
on the one hand, and discussions for the sake of teaching and learning on the
other.I® Participants in a sophistical discussion rely on premises which only
appear to be endoxa and their arguments are often apparent but not true syllo
gisms.^ sophistical discussions are purely competitive; contestants will use
virtually any means to achieve their end of appearing to defeat the opponent,
or at least of not suffering defeat.·*·® At the other end of the spectrum are
discussions between teacher and learner - "didactic" discussions. Here the
commitment to truth is absolute: the learner, who plays the part of answerer
in the discussion, must always say what he thinks is true, and the teacher qua
teacher must always show what is true.

Aristotle says that dialectical discussions are undertaken for the sake
of "training, testing and inquiry."·*·® The dialectician gains proficiency in
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argumentation since he must argue with valid syllogisms, and must learn to
recognize fallacies. Sometimes such discussions are undertaken not just for
the sake of training and practice in argumentation, but for the purpose of
testing a knowledge claim. The defender of a thesis may claim to know that
the thesis is true, and dialectic provides one with the ability to test such
claims. (Aristotle thus speaks of peirastike, the "art of testing", as a part
or form of dialectic.)^
Even though the aim of dialectical arguments is not
to establish truth - indeed, as we have seen, the dialectician sometimes
argues for false conclusions and rests his arguments on false premises nevertheless, such arguments may be useful for philosophical inquiry insofar
as they indicate the extent to which different views can be supported by
reputable opinions. An initially paradoxical thesis might seem more plausible
if one can show that it is implied by certain views that are commonly held.
(Some of Socrates' arguments seem to fit this description.) Dialectic may
also help üs in philosophy by enabling us to argue both for and against a
given thesis: Aristotle suggests that when we are engaged in a philosophical
inquiry (not a dialectical discussion), the ability to argue both sides will
help us to see more readily where the truth lies.18 This ability to see both
strengths and weaknesses in a position is especially useful when one is
inquiring into the first principles of a particular science or discipline, for
since the principles are primitive in relation to the other truths of the
science, the relevant reputable opinions are all one has to go on.19

While practice in dialectic is useful for philosophy in several dif
ferent ways, Aristotle clearly treats dialectical discussion and philosophi
cal inquiry as distinct, nonoverlapping activities: insofar as one is engaged
in dialectical discussion one is not engaged in philosophical inquiry, and
vice versa.20 m the Topics the terms "dialectic" and "dialectical" are used
exclusively for the kind of rule-governed discussion I have described.
Aristotle does not speak of a "dialectical method" of doing philosophy; he
does not distinguish a type of dialectic that might be used in a philosophical
investigation, nor does he speak of a "philosophical use of dialectic." All
of these notions, as far as I can see, are simply not to be found in the
Topics,.

Ill

I now want to turn to the familiar passage at the beginning of
Aristotle's discussion of acrasia in Bk. VII of the NE in which he outlines
the method of inquiry he will use in the subsequent investigation. This
method has been carefully scrutinized in a number of recent discussions, 21 and
I will not offer a detailed examination. For my purposes, it will be enough,
as in the case of dialectic in the Topics, to sketch the main features of the
method.
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Aristotle gives the fullest description of the method in NE VII 1, 22
but there are a few other passages in the ethical treatises that supply useful
information, most notably in the discussions of happiness and friendship in
Books I and VII of the EE respectively.23 Although endoxa or "reputable
opinions" seem to be a prominent feature of the method, Aristotle does not use
the terms "dialectic" or "dialectical" in any of these passages. As we shall
see, it is not at all clear that Aristotle would approve of characterizing the
method as "dialectical" or labelling it as "the method of dialectic." It
therefore seems prudent to follow Jonathan Barnes's lead, and to refer to it
as the "method of endoxa.■

The method instructs us to begin by gathering and setting out the various
phainomena pertaining to the subject of inquiry, in the case of a science
like astronomy the phainomena would be the observations of the movements of
the heavenly b o d i e s , b u t in the case of acrasia the phainomena are the
endoxa or the reputable opinions about it. in the next stage we bring out and
discuss the conflicts among the endoxa and the various aporiai or difficulties
that we encounter in thinking about the subject, in the final stage we
attempt to solve the aporiai and, if possible, to show the truth "of all the
endoxa...or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authoritative."

The endoxa we begin with are often not clearly formulated, and one of the
ways of solving the aporiai is to clarify the endoxa by making distinctions
and substituting terminology which is more p r e c i s e . c o n f l i c t s among the
endoxa may disappear once these are clarified and given more precise formula
tions. Using the same techniques we show in what ways the reputable opinions
are true and in what ways they are not true. It is not always possible to
■save* the endoxa in this way; sometimes we may simply have to reject some of
the endoxa. Given that endoxa can be ranked in terms of their reputability,
if we have to sacrifice some we should always sacrifice those which are rela
tively less reputable and preserve those which are most reputable or most
"authoritative." Through the process of clarifying, sifting and pruning, we
should try to maximize the degree of reputability within the set of accepted
endoxa while preserving overall consistency.

One naturally wonders why Aristotle thinks that a satisfactory account of
acrasia will justify, if not all, then most of the endoxa about it. There is
an important assumption underlying the method which is made explicit in a few
places. Consider the following methodological remarks at the beginning of ee

16:
About all these matters we must seek conviction through
arguments, using the phainomena as evidence and paradigms
(marturiois kai paradeigmasi). It would be best that all
men should agree with what we are going to say, but if not,
then that all should in some way agree; and this they will
do if they can be brought to shift their ground (hoper
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metabibazomenoi poiesousin). For each individual has
something to contribute to the truth, and with this as a
starting-point we must give some sort of proof about these
matters. For by advancing from sayings which are true but
not clear he will arrive at sayings that are [both true
and] clear, always exchanging the more familiar and
confused statements for those which are more knowable.26

All endoxa apparently contain some truth; 27 the endoxa need to be re
fined, more precisely expressed, so that their truth will be clear. This
assumption is weakened somewhat in the NE VII in that Aristotle there implies
that some of the endoxa may have to be rejected.28 But still the goal is
something approaching a consensus omnium. So an important assumption
underlying the method of endoxa is that all or most endoxa about a given
subject are at least partially true; this assumption explains the requirement
that our account not only accord with but justify all or most of the endoxa.29

IV

If we now compare the accounts I have given of dialectic in the Topics
and the method of endoxa in the NE, we immediately notice a number of super
ficial contrasts but also, I think, some deeper and more substantial dif
ferences. The method of endoxa does not involve a rule-governed discussion
between two individuals who take on the roles of questioner and answerer. The
kind of inquiry envisioned by the method could be carried out by a group of
several people, but it could just as easily be conducted by one person work
ing alone. Further, while the business of setting out and solving aporiai is
a prominent feature of the method of endoxa, it does not seem to play any
essential role in the dialectical discussions described in the Topics.

We notice deeper dissimilarities between the two activities when we
reflect on the kinds of arguments used and the role of endoxa. As we have
seen, it is sometimes advisable for a dialectician to base his arguments on
false premises and to argue for false conclusions. Arguments of this sort
would seem to be completely out of place in the method of endoxa; if the aim
is to show the truth contained in the endoxa, it is difficult to see how
arguments from false premises or to false conclusions would ever be appro
priate. Further, the role played by endoxa in the two activities seems quite
different. The dialectician does not try to justify all or most of the endoxa
about a given subject. His aim in a dialectical discussion is limited to
defending or refuting a specific thesis. He must build his arguments on the
strongest premises he can muster, i.e. on premises that are as endoxon as
possible. The practitioner of the method of endoxa, on the other hand, is not
bound by this requirement; Aristotle does not stipulate that when we attempt
to reconcile and justify the endoxa we must argue from premises that are them
selves endoxa.30 m fact, his own arguments in the discussion of acrasia (and
in the discussion of friendship in EE VII) rest on premises which are pretty
clearly not endoxa.21 The roles played by endoxa in the two activities seem in
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a way to be reversed. Though the conclusion the dialectician argues for need
not be endoxon, the supporting premises must be as endoxon as possible. The
practitioner of the method of endoxa, on the other hand, need not base his
arguments on endoxa, but the views he supports or justifies must be as endoxon
as possible.

in view of these substantial differences between the method of endoxa and
dialectic as described in the Topics, it seems quite mistaken to say that the
description of the method in NE VII 1 gives "a compact summary of the proce
dure" involved in dialectical discussions, or that "the account of the dialec
tical method in the Topics and its practice in the Ethics is close."32 if we
want to continue to describe the method of endoxa as Aristotle's dialectical
method, then we should at least be clear about the fact that this method does
not correspond to the description of dialectic in the Topics.

The prominence of endoxa in the method of endoxa has naturally led people
to look for connections between the method and what Aristotle says about
dialectic in the Topics. However, I think it is more illuminating to compare
the method with Aristotle's conception of what is involved in a scientific
inquiry, a s Owen has suggested,Aristotle seems to have used the term
phainomena as a variant for endoxa because he saw a parallel between the role
of endoxa in a philosophical inquiry and that of perceptual phainomena in
scientific investigations, in the investigation of some natural phenomenon
like earthquakes or eclipses we have to begin with an extensive familiarity
with the phainomena - the various observations that we and others have made in
regard to these events. Aristotle typically criticizes theories of his pre
decessors for failure to account for some of the relevant phainomena, or for
proposing hypotheses that directly conflict with some of the phainomena. in a
well known passage in the pe cáelo he says that the ultimate test of a scien
tific theory is how well it accounts for the perceptible phainomena.34

in a similar way, in the investigation of acrasia we must begin with a
good grasp of the relevant phainomena. Here, however, the phainomena consist
chiefly if not exclusively of the endoxa or reputable opinions about acrasia.35
The test of an explanation of acrasia, as of a scientific explanation, is how
well it accounts for the phainomena; an adequate explanation must account for
all or most of the relevant phainomena.36 m both the scientific and the
philosophical cases, the proposed explanations or theories are presumably
suggested by the phainomena, but they are not based on the phainomena in the
sense that they could be inferred from them. In other words, the arguments
and explanations we give in accounting for the endoxa about acrasia are not
based on those endoxa. consider, for example, Aristotle's appeal to two sorts
of premises in a practical syllogism as a way of distinguishing different
senses in which a man might act against his knowledge of what he ought to do.37
This is a bit of technical apparatus that comes, not from endoxa, but from
Aristotle's own philosophical workshop.

It is sometimes thought that according to the "dialectical method", or
the method of endoxa, the arguments we use to account for the endoxa should
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themselves be based on endoxa. 38 Nothing like this is said in Aristotle's
description of the method in NE VII; moreover, the view seems quite implausi
ble if one looks at the actual arguments and explanations put forward by
Aristotle in his discussion of acrasia. I believe the source of this view is
the belief that there is a close connection between the method of endoxa and
dialectic as described in the Topics; since the premises of dialecical argu
ment must be endoxa, one infers that the same is true of arguments or expla
nations in the method of endoxa. I hope what I have said about the dissimi
larities between dialectic and the method of endoxa, and about the close
parallel between this method and Aristotle's conception of scientific expla
nation, will make us question the view that arguments conducted in accordance
with the method must be based on endoxa.

V

If what I have argued thusfar is correct, we should not look to the
Topics for illumination in regard to Aristotle's method in ethics. But what
about the so-called method of endoxa? it is often claimed that this is the
method Aristotle follows, not only in his discussion of acrasia, but through
out the ethical works, in particular, the discussion of happiness in NE I is
thought to be "dialectical," and to be a clear example of the kind of inquiry
described in VII 1. We begin with a setting out of the endoxa about happi
ness, views held by the many and the wise. Aristotle then argues for his own
account, i.e. in his argument appealing to the human ergon. Finally, he
returns to the endoxa, and tries to show that his definition can account for
all or most of them.39 There is no explicit reference to aporiae in the
discussion, but bringing to light the conflicts between the different views
about the nature of happiness would presumably exemplify this part of the
method of endoxa.

There has been some dispute about whether the premises of the ergon argu
ment, which leads to Aristotle's account of happiness, are regarded as endoxa.
Those who have claimed that the premises are not endoxa have inferred that
this part of the discussion at least is not dialectical.^Of n o w it is true
that if the premises of the ergon argument are not endoxa, the argument would
not fit the description of dialectical arguments given in the Topics. But, as
I noted earlier, it does not seem to be a requirement of the method of endoxa
that the account given be based on endoxa. There is no mention of such a re
quirement in the description of the method, and it is pretty clear that parts
at least of Aristotle's account of acrasia are not based on endoxa. So even
if the premises of the ergon argument are not endoxa, this would not prevent
the discussion of happiness from being a clear application of the method of
endoxa.

Although the stages of the discussion of happiness correspond pretty
closely to the stages of the method of endoxa, there are some fairly important
discrepancies, as we shall see. In view of these discrepancies, I think it
would be misleading to say that Aristotle is following the method in his
examination of happiness.
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A key requirement of the method is that one give an account of, or show
the truth of, all or most of the endoxa about the subject under investigation.
But Aristotle apparently does not think that he needs to do this in the case
of happiness. At the beginning of I 8, after he has presented his definition
of happiness, he tells us that we should consider it not only in the light of
the foregoing argument but also in the light of the legomena, the things said
about happiness.41 He then tries to show that his account is in accord with
the various legomena or endoxa concerning happiness.

Aristotle is not concerned, however, to preserve and vindicate all or
most of the relevant endoxa. His choice of views against which he will test
his account is quite selective. There is no mention of the commonly held
views that the good is pleasure or honor or wealth. These views are included
in the initial survey of endoxa in chapters 4 and 5, and are rather brusquely
dismissed as inadequate.^ Aristotle apparently believes that since these
endoxa are not even partially true there is no need for him to show that his
account of happiness is in accord with them.

It is also noteworthy that nowhere in Book I does Aristotle suggest that
there is an element of truth in all of the endoxa, or that we must advance
from views that are true but unclear to views that are both true and clear.
There is a passage in chapter 8 that is sometimes taken as an endorsement of
this optimistic evaluation of endoxa. After Aristotle has gone through a list
of the views against which he will test his theory, he mentions that some of
these views have been held by many people and men of old, others by a few
distinguished individuals. He then says:
It is unlikely that either of these [groups] should be
entirely mistaken; it is more likely that they are right
about some one thing or even about most. (1098b 28-29)

Hardie interprets this passage as saying that the various endoxa about
happiness are "likely to be right in at least some one respect or even in most
respects."43 But we should note, first of all, that Aristotle is not talking
about all of the endoxa but only a select group, secondly, he does not say
that each view held by the two groups of individuals will be right in one or
even most respects, but that these groups will be right in one or even most of
the views that they hold.
It is understandable that Aristotle would have a more reserved attitude
towards the endoxa about happiness, given his view that one's conception of
the good is strongly influenced by one's character.44 He believes that most
men are radically mistaken about happiness, equating it with an apolaustic
life, a life he characterizes as "suitable to beasts."45 once bad habits are
ingrained in one's character, there is little hope that arguments will have
any effect on that person's values. Only the fortunate minority who have had
a good upbringing will be able to derive genuine profit from lectures on
ethics.4”

What I am suggesting, then, is that Aristotle does not try to vindicate
all or most of the endoxa about happiness because he believes that one's
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values are a reflection of one's character and that most people are likely to
be deeply mistaken in their conception of the good life. The views which he
argues are in harmony with his account of happiness are pretty clearly the
views of people who have had the "right" sort of upbringing.
Por some identify happiness with virtue, some with practi
cal wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom,
others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure
or not without pleasure; while others include also external
prosperity.
(1098b 23-26)

There is therefore an important difference between the method Aristotle
follows in his discussion of happiness and the method of endoxa outlined in
Book VII.

VI

If we compare the discussions of happiness in the EE and the NE, and in
particular the remarks about method, we see much closer connections between
the Eudemian discussion and the method of endoxa. For instance, the term
phainomena is used several times as a variant for endoxa, in the same way as
in NE VII; in the Nicomachean discussion this term is never used - instead we
find either doxai (1095a 29) or legomena (1098b 10). This is probably not an
accident for the term phainomena used in this way occurs fairly frequently in
the EE but it does not seem to be used in this way in the NE except in the
passage on the method of endoxa. In the discussion of friendship in EE VII,
for example, there are some prefatory remarks of a methodological nature in
which ta phainomena is used interchangeably with t£ dokounta, and the term
crops up again and again in later chapters of the book. By contrast, the term
phainomena does not occur at all in the Nicomachean discussion of friendship.47

Earlier we cited a passage in EE I in which it is said that all of the
endoxa about happiness are true in some way or in some respect, and that what
is needed is to clarify these views so that we eventually arrive at statements
that are both true and clear. The aim of the inquiry is thus the same as that
of the method of endoxa: to preserve and vindicate most if not all of the
reputable opinions. This difference between the Eudemian and Nicomachean
discussions of happiness is related to the terminological difference I
mentioned - the fact that phainomena is used in the EE but not in the NE· in
the case of a scientific investigation, the phainomena we begin with often
seem puzzing and appear to conflict with each other. We assume that a correct
explanation will solve the puzzles and show that all the phainomena are "well
founded" and do not conflict with each other. It may sometimes be necessary
to question some of the phainomena, but an explanation that committed us to
rejecting a significant portion of the phainomena would not be acceptable. As
noted earlier, the method of endoxa involves the same view of the relationship
between explanation and endoxa: a satisfactory explanation must account for
all or most of the endoxa. Because of this parallel, I suggested that
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Aristotle thought it appropriate to use the term phainomena as a variant for
endoxa in his description of the method; it is a way of bringing out the
similarity he sees between, e.g., an account of the motions of the planets and
an account of acrasia.

We have seen that in the EE he believes that an account of the same sort
- one that vindicates most if not all of the endoxa - can be given in the case
of happiness, while in the NE he does not hold this view, in the NE it is
enough if his account of happiness accords with a select group of endoxa - the
beliefs of those who are likely to have sound views about the nature of the
good life. Moreover, the relationship between these endoxa and his account of
happiness seems to be understood in a different way. instead of the account
vindicating, or showing the truth of, the endoxa, he speaks of the endoxa
"agreeing with", or "being in harmony with" (sunadei) his account. Because of
these differences, there is no longer a close parallel between the endoxa
about happiness and the phainomena in a scientific inquiry; and I would
suggest that this is why Aristotle does not use the term phainomena in his
discussion of happiness in the NE.

We might plausibly suppose that Aristotle, at the time of writing the EE
and the common Bk. VII, saw close parallels between the methods involved in
ethical and scientific inquiries, and that he used similar terminology to draw
attention to these parallels. Later, when he wrote the NE, he came to believe
that there were important differences between the two methods, and he changed
his terminology accordingly. This seems a plausible hypothesis; but there may
be other equally plausible ways of explaining the methodological differences
between the two treatises. The important point is that these differences
exist, and that the method Aristotle follows in the Nicomachean discussion of
happiness is not the method of endoxa.

VIII

What i have tried to do so far is not to give an account of Aristotle's
method in ethics but to clarify the phainomena that need to be considered in
giving such an account. I first argued that it is a mistake to view the
method of endoxa of Bk. VII of the Ethics as essentially the same as the
method of dialectical discussion described in the Topics. I then tried to
show that, although Aristotle seems to follow the method of endoxa in his
treatment of happiness in the EE, he uses somewhat different procedures in the
parallel discussion in the NE. In my concluding remarks I would like to
discuss, in a general and tentative way, the question I mentioned at the
beginning: what sort of rational justification of ethical first principles can
be given, according to Aristotle?I

I mentioned three different answers that have been given by commenta
tors. some claim that, according to Aristotle, we come to acquire a grasp of
ethical principles through habituation, and they are not susceptible to any
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form of rational justification, others argue that, although moral first
principles cannot be scientifically demonstrated, they can be justified
through dialectical arguments, i.e. arguments based on endoxa. A third view
contends that Aristotle bases his moral theory, not on endoxa, but on certain
principles about human nature drawn from his psychology and metaphysics.

The thought behind the first view might be sketched along the following
lines. Aristotle holds that we cannot deliberate about ends, and in particu
lar about the ultimate end which is the first principle of ethics; we must
simply assume this end as the starting point of our deliberations. It might
be thought that, even though we cannot deliberate about the ultimate end,
there is surely some other form of reasoning which could be used to justify
one conception of the end over another. However, Aristotle says at one point
that the first principle of ethics is not supported by reasoning or argument,
but it is virtue, either natural or produced by habituation, that is
responsible for our grasp of the end.I
4®
*

What this passage says more exactly is that there is no logos
didaskalikos of first principles, either in the theoretical or in the practi
cal sphere. This is surprising in that, in the case of the sciences, although
Aristotle holds that it is not possible to demonstrate first principles - i.e.
to give an apodeixis of them - in the well known passage at the beginning of
the Topics he suggests that such principles can be reached through dialectical
arguments. Perhaps we can alleviate the difficulty by noting that the expres
sion logos didaskalikos has a special technical meaning in the Topics, and is
contrasted with the expression logos dialektjkos.4® A logos didaskalikos is
in effect a scientific demonstration, while a logos dialektikos is an argument
based on endoxa. If logos didaskalikos is understood in this technical sense
in the passage in the Ethics, then Aristotle will be making the not surprising
claim that our grasp of ethical first principles is not based on scientific
demonstration. This would leave open the possibility that, even though a
person's good character is chiefly responsible for his or her grasp of the
end, one might be able to justify that end by a kind of argument different
from scientific demonstration.

This is surely what Aristotle intended to say, for he does offer an
argument for his account of the ultimate end, viz. the argument appealing to
the human ergon, so the question becomes: How should we characterize
Aristotle's argument for his first principle, given that it cannot be a
scientific demonstration (or logos didaskalikos)? It is sometimes thought
that if an argument is not demonstrative, it must be dialectical; and there
fore the argument for the definition of happiness must be dialectical.

I think it would be generally agreed that at least part of Aristotle's
argument for his first principle is dialectical. The critical survey of
opinions about the nature of happiness in chapter 5 can be seen as part of the
overall argument insofar as it eliminates several competing conceptions of the
good. It is generally agreed that the specific arguments employed in this
critique are based on endoxa, and thus fit the description of dialectical
arguments.

*
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However, whether the argument appealing to the human ergon is dialectical
is not so clear, and there is much disagreement among the commentators.
Cooper believes that the premises are clearly introduced as endoxa, but Hardie
and others have argued that they are derived from Aristotle’s scientific works
and therefore not endoxa.5β Irwin has recently argued that, although the
premises of the ergon argument are derived from the De Anima and Metaphysics,
they are based on endoxa - non-ethical endoxa -, and so the argument can still
be viewed as dialectical.51
Irwin believes that Aristotle needs to go, and does go, outside of ethics
in order to find adequate support for his ethical first principle. However,
there does not seem to be any indication in the text that principles from
other disciplines are being appealed to. And further, we should bear in mind
that Aristotle refers to the definition of happiness as a first principle, and
says that because it is a first principle we must not ask for the 'why', the
dihoti; showing the 'that', the hoti, is sufficient.52 m other words, since
the account of happiness is a first principle, it is not possible to derive it
from more fundamental principles, so the ergon argument is not an argument
that shows the dihoti - that gives the ground or explanation of the truth of
the conclusion. The premises of the argument cannot be prior to, and more
knowable than, the conclusion.

In I 13 of the Posterior Analytics Aristotle distinguishes between
syllogisms of the hoti and those of the dihoti, i.e. between those that show
that the conclusion is true and those that show not only that it is true but
why it is t r u e . T h i s is clearly the distinction referred to in the passage
following the ergon argument, we have a syllogism of the hoti when the middle
term is not the cause (the aitia) of the conclusion's being true, but it is
more familiar and better known ¿o us; the conclusion, on the other hand, is
better known or more knowable in itself. 54 Applying this to the ergon argu
ment, Aristotle's point would be that the premises are more familiar and
better known to us, but the conclusion is more knowable in itself. The argu
ment would only provide a justification of the first principle in the weak
sense that it would provide plausible grounds for someone who did not yet have
an adequate grasp of the principle. Once one has a grasp of the definition as
a first principle, one sees that it is not possible to justify it by deriving
it from more fundamental truths. This seems to be the lesson we are to draw
from Aristotle's comments on the ergon argument.

In the light of these results, the question whether the premises of the
argument are endoxa does not seem so important. However, the fact that the
hoti - dihoti distinction is used in connection with the argument may be an
indication that Aristotle did not regard the premises as having the status of
endoxa. For although a syllogism of the hoti is not an apodeixis or demon
stration in the strict sense, it is nevertheless a kind of a p o d e i x i s . The
premises are, by assumption, known to be true, and the conclusion is validly
inferred. Dialectical arguments, in which the premises are laid down not as
truths but as endoxa, are always contrasted with apodeictic arguments.

These questions obviously need further inquiry.

As I said at the outset.
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my chief objective in this paper is the prior task of setting out and clarify
ing the data that we need to consider in giving an account of Aristotle's
method in ethics. I have tried to show that these data or phainomena are more
complex than is usually supposed, in particular, I have argued that it may be
quite misleading to speak of the method of endoxa as the dialectical method,
and that it is a mistake to think there are close parallels between this
method and the concept of dialectic discussed in the Topics, it is often
claimed that Aristotle follows the method of endoxa in his discussion of
happiness in NE I; I suggested that although the procedures used by Aristotle
in the EE seem to accord with the method, the procedures of the Nicomachean
discussion are different in important ways, with a clearer grasp of the
complexity of the phainomena, we should be in a better position to understand
exactly what Aristotle's method in ethics is.
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